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  The development of contacts and close cooperation between Poland and the Communities, which 
was crowned with signature of the Association Agreement in 1991, took place during a lively debate 
concerning further integration in Europe. It was proved in Maastricht, that Europe (or European Union) 
strives not only to its deepening but widening as well. 
  It was realized that prosperity and stability of Union requires inclusion to its federation not only 
rich countries of EFTA but also those of Central and Eastern Europe. Being economically integrated 
by one foreign policy and the same currency, Union can have a positive impact on changes in countries 
of Central-Eastern Europe. Yet, it is a challenge both for Europe and Poland alike. 
  A challenge for Europe, since being plunged in economic, social and financial crisis, Union has 
neither an eventual conception  nor vision of its own "architecture". Both political and institutional - 
legislative systems, as well as decisive process need being reformed. Particularly, decisive mechanism 
should be more clear and precise when facing a possibility of widening1.  
  Union can be labelled a hybrid, that is something between a federal country and a federation of 
countries. It is still involved in the process of formation and is unprecedented in the world. 
  Maastricht is essentially a treaty born in a divided Europe. A major problem for  Poland in 
planning its entry into the Community is that this new agenda is not yet clear. The goalpost for 
integration are being constantly moved and it is certain that the Community at the end of this century 
will be very different from that which exists today2.  
 
 
New European Architecture is not clear 
  
 
  It is worth mentioning that the European Union is not an ideal example of political and economic 
harmony and the Maastricht Treaty is far from playing a role of the Decalog. 
   A new challenge for the Union is caused by an eventual end of 
a conflict between East and West, which fact has changed the political map of Europe. Before 1989 
Europe did not have any politically significant Centre, and thus did not experience any problems 
connected with a constellation grouped round such Centre. 
    All attempts of opposition of the continent`s national structure and an idea of its integration are fated 
to fail. Europe is facing challenges which are being brought by international democracy. 
  Nowadays Europe is going through a transition stage and it cannot be neither widened nor 
deepened taking into consideration both logical as well as geographical point of view. It should be 
instead changed and shaped in a manner which would not disturb interests of inhabiting nations as well 
as principles of democracy. 
  A tactics of "balanced powers" which proved to be effective in Europe in the past is not sufficient 
any longer. 
  An idea of widening and deepening is seen in different ways in various Member States. This is a 
result of different economic and political situation in these countries. 
  In context of differentiated visions of United Europe the integration process should be designed in 
the form conclusive to national interests and general principles of democracy. 
  The Maastricht Treaty was formed for the conditions of the past periods which had been based on 
an idea of balance of powers.   This architecture is, however, not sufficient to meet the present challenges. This calls for a 
modernization of the Union towards an efficient and transparent structure and clearly defined 
presidency. The democratic credibility should be increased. The Maastricht Treaty should be revised in 
the following directions. 
a) The Centre should be comprised of two-chamber system including European Parliament and Union 
Council - the chamber of member states - in which all decisions concerning Union will be adopted 
according to the principle of legal equality of both chambers. It should result in a link between 
principles of federalism and democracy.                                              
b) The Commission should be transformed into a Union government formed by a president, according 
to the rule of ministerial responsibility and omitting the procedure of quantitative representation.                                    
c) The influence of member states on the role of European Council should be preserved. Thus, it 
should lay out, as a "collective head of the state", main political directions.                     
d) Union`s sphere of activity  should be agreed upon by specifically laid down obligations as well as a 
catalogue of elementary rights.  
 
  Such an architecture of Union would be reasonable as well as clear. Moreover, it would remain in 
agreement with democratic constitutions of member states. Besides, alike principles and sphere of 
subsidiarity application need more precise definition. Presently, it is being interpreted in  15 different 
ways.       
  Independently of the Maastricht Treaty amendment, an expansion of decentralizing tendencies and 
probability of forming blocs (e.g. bloc of countries more advanced in integration, bloc of poor 
countries or net payers bloc) can be expected to appear. 
Especially a division into two blocs is likely to take place3: 
- a bloc of South-West Europe countries (with France as a leader) 
- a bloc of North-East Europe countries (with Germany as a leader) 
  In presented situation these two countries will have to provide help in negotiating common 
interests as well as preserving Union consensus. 
  The leaders (Germany, France) should engage themselves in providing possibility for different 
levels of integration in case the intended scenario should be endangered. 
  Integration of Poland with the European Union makes a double challenge for us since provisions 
of the agreement must be fulfilled within the period of internal transformation of the Polish economy. 
  The apparent choice between transformation and integration for Poland was answered in the same 
way as the deepening/widening issue in the Community; both have to occur simultaneously. 
  EU must support the reform efforts of CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) and the most effective 
way for the Community would be to involve itself in the building of institutions and to provide access 
to markets. 
  The combination of transformation and integration objectives presents a challenge for Polish 
decision-makers. 
  This challenge concerns a reasonable and politically acceptable balance between internal process 
and external developments. 
  It refers to all areas of economic and political life. The difficulty is that we have to adjust not only 
to what already exists, but also to what will be found in the Community at the end  
of present decade. 
 
 
Which type of membership for Poland 
 
 
  The Union should remember that the transformation process in Poland is related to high economic 
and social costs, lack of political stability as well as frustration. 
  Poland, like other countries of CEC (Central European Countries) needs political perspective to 
continue the reform process, to maintain peace and internal stability. 
  We have done much progress so we can`t be satisfied by an abstract idea of united Europe. It is 
concrete concept of integration and cooperation that we expect from Bonn, Brussels, London, Paris. 
  The Union should develop the European Agreement into the concept of early "premature" 
membership. It would allow the participation in the evolution of the Union. What is extremely necessary, is an opening of the internal market for Poland and other CEC in the more consequent way, 
also for sensitive products. 
  However this "early membership" is differently stated by London, Paris, Bonn and Brussels. 
-  London (supported by Rome and Madrid) suggests a gradual (step by step) unification of countries 
of central Europe, leaving economic integration for the future. 
-  Paris is afraid of fast integration of eastern countries with the Union, due to fears that it will 
strengthen the position of Germany. France opts for integration with "two speeds", (in this concept we 
belong to the second speed). 
-  Bonn stresses on quick membership in the economic and political field. Rapid expansion to the 
East is very important. They feel tired funding the development of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. 
They would rather increase the assistance for the countries of eastern Europe. The planned financial 
assistance for these countries in the following 5 years will be 11 bln ECU comparing to 140 bln ECU 
assistance for the purest member countries of the Union. There is an obvious conflict between Bonn 
and Paris.  
 
-  As far as Brussels is concerned the European Commission tries to find a "modus vivendi" in this 
respect. 
 
  The strategy of the Commission is to create a European Integration Area which would include 
Poland (and other Central European Countries) into the Union structure except for economic 
membership in the EC. As a result we would be included into the political cooperation, common 
foreign policy and common security policy. After some time we could become a member of European 
Economic Area, which however does not cover integration of agriculture products. 
  There is a danger that this strategy would turn out to be a substitute of a normal membership. As 
we know  provisional arrangements are always long lasting. Poland should try to find another 
alternative, based  on more promising conditions for our membership. We need clear definition of 
accession criteria in the economic and institutional fields and a transition  timetable before and after 
joining. It will make our vision more realistic. 
  Poland`s membership in the European Union is likely to be achieved in two main ways which in 
practice may become a "hybrid". 
a) realization of formal criteria set out in Article 237 of R. Treaty and Article 0 of Treaty on European 
Union, which constitute that "each European country may apply for a membership in the 
Union/Community". 
As requirements of admission the Union Treaty enforces so called criteria of convergence concerning 
inflation, budget deficit, public debt as well as a long-term bank rate4.                     
b) arising of extraordinary political circumstances, as happened in case of Greece, Spain or Portugal 
when a political decision concerning the need to strengthen and stabilize democratic systems of these 
countries allowed to formulate special conditions of admission, including relatively long preliminary 
term as well as grant of considerable financial support. 
Since the first variant appears to be more difficult for Poland we should therefore apply for application 
of a more mild criterium for instance, macroeconomic stability instead of those indicated by the Union 
Treaty. The second variant is found to be more advantageous one, but still it includes a factor of 
uncertainty! 
 
 
External support for transition 
 
 
  After the World War II the countries of Central and Eastern Europe rejected - on the initiative of 
the USSR - the Marshal Plan. However in 1989 these countries anticipated the second round of that 
Plan. But it did not occur. There will not be the second round of the Marshall Plan for many reasons. 
First of all, there is no country with surplus in the balance of payments large enough to replicate the 
model of US Marshall Plan. Japan, country which has been recording surplus in the balance of 
payments, is not so much interested in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
  Moreover, Central and Eastern Europe is becoming larger, and as it turns out — more absorbent to 
foreign financial assistance.   On the other hand, the European Union carries out its own integration programs and there always 
is the trade-off between "widening and deepening". Assistance for countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe is obviously associated with the idea of deepening, as it weakens the Union's capability to 
strengthen the integration processes. Problem of "deepening first or widening first" is question of 
money. 
  During the past years, there has been some improvement in the access to international finance. 
However the gains are still limited. To a large extent access hinges on the commitment of the national 
authorities to meaningful economic reform and sound macroeconomic policy. Such policy pave the 
way first to multilateral and eventually private source of finance. 
  Due to general concerns about creditworthiness, access to private medium- and long-term funds is 
available to only a few countries in transition. The Czech republic is the most creditworthy of the 
transition economies, Hungary also made further progress. Poland will probably be able to re-enter the 
financial markets following the debt reduction agreement with its commercial debt creditors. 
  As far as access to guaranteed bank and non-bank credits is concerned, Poland, like other 
economies in transition, has managed to obtain broader insurance coverage from western export credit 
agencies. However conditions of this coverage remain expensive and restrictive. 
  Given the difficulties in obtaining finance from such sources, Poland (as other transition 
economies) is virtually dependent on the multilateral financial institutions and international initiatives 
by the G-24 and G-7. 
  In 1994, after some years of negotiations, Poland normalized its relations with the London and 
Paris Clubs. Poland reached Brady-style agreement with creditor banks to reduce its commercial debts. 
Earlier Poland obtained the reduction of foreign debt with official creditors. As a result, it should 
attract more private capital. 
  As far as the credit ratings and borrowing conditions are concerned, perception of Poland's 
financial standing has improved as a result of the debt reduction agreement. Poland till the end of 1994, 
unlike Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia did not received a credit rating. However, it is possible, 
that in the near future Poland "will receive a rating of around Ba1/BB- (sub-investment grade) which 
will help its re-entry into the international capital markets" — as this was stated by the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe. 
  FDI in Poland still remains below expectations. In April 1995, FDI in Poland is estimated at USD 
5 bln (USD 10 bln with investment commitments). Portfolio investment, after the institutional 
framework has been created, has been growing to significant proportions. 
  In 1994 Poland continued to make little use of guaranteed and official credits. The limited use of 
these credits is due to the high cost and the restrictive conditions applying to credit insurance. At 
present export credit insurance is available form the following agencies: ECGD (Export Credit 
Guarantee Department), EXIM (Export-Import bank of the US), Hermes, NCM (Nederlandssche 
Creditverzekering Maatschappij), FGB (Finnish Guarantee Department). 
  Given the general lack of access to private markets and the stringent conditions associated with 
guaranteed credits, multilateral facilities are of crucial importance. 
  Between 1992 and 1994 IMF arrangement for Poland totalled SDR 1,1 bln. 
  Commitments of the World Bank and other development institutions for all transition economies 
are not relevant to the needs of countries in question. These figures, compared to the Marshal Plan, are 
virtually low. 
 
Table : Gross disbursement of the development banks to the transition economies in 1991 - 1993, (mln 
USD) 
Institution ³1991 ³1992 ³1993 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
World Bank  ³167  ³1151  ³1400 
EBRD ³-  ³166  ³489 
EIB ³30  ³143  ³179 
  ³ ³ ³ 
Total ³197  ³1460  ³2068 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÁ 
Source, UN Economic Commission for Europe, 1994.  
Growing EIB role in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
On 13 September 1993 the Council of Ministers of the European Community took a position of 
principle in favor of new EIB lending of up to ECU 3 mld over the next three years in ten Central and 
Eastern European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
 
The EIB started lending in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 following an authorization by its Board 
of Governors in 1989 to provide ECU 1 bln in Hungary and Poland. The EIB financing was then 
extended for projects in other countries. 
 
From 1990 till the end of 1994, the EIB lending in Poland totalled 886 mln ECU (1/3 of all EIB 
lending to countries of Central and Eastern Europe) of which 333 mln ECU was lended in 1994. 
 
Projects mainly concerned the modernization and extension of energy generation and distribution, 
telecommunications, transport projects (roads, railways, airports, traffic systems etc.). 
 
The EIB lending in Poland is coordinated with the EC Commission which is providing the funds from 
PHARE program. The EIB does not grant general purpose loans, its lending is closely tied to specific 
projects with priority given to: 
- transport and telecommunications, 
- the energy sector, 
- industry and tourism. 
 
 
The financial aid for Poland in the framework of the PHARE program 
  
 
  The PHARE (Poland, Hungary - Assistance for restructuring of their Economies) is the biggest 
source of the not repayable foreign aid supporting social and economic changes in Poland. The 
PHARE as the aid program of the European Union (EU) is treated by both, the European Commission 
and Poland, as the instrument in the process of integration of Poland with the European Union. 
  In the European Agreement (EA) on the Association of Poland and the European Union launched 
on 16th of December 1991, the EU declares providing Poland with further financial assistance in the 
form of grants and loans. Three types of assistance were set (see articles 95-100 of the EA): 
-  not repayable financial aid (in the framework of the PHARE program), 
-  loans from the European Investment Bank, and 
-  financial assistance in the exceptional cases to support stabilizing and restructuring activities in 
Poland. 
  The PHARE program is the assistance program of the EU which helps the process of restructuring 
the most important sectors the Polish economy. Every year the indicative program is negotiated with 
the European Commission, which defines priority areas in  need of assistance. Afterwards the 
negotiations on the more detailed programmed follow. The signature of the indicative program 
PHARE 1994. 
  On 13th of October 1994 in Warsaw Mr Jacek Saryusz-Wolski - the Government Plenipotentiary 
for European Integration and Foreign Assistance and Mr Alan Mayhew - the Director of the I DG of 
the European Commission coordinating PHARE, signed the indicative PHARE 1994 program. 
  The signed document includes  agreements made  between the government of the Republic of 
Poland and the European Commission about  use of the non-repayable funds given to Poland by the 
EU in the year 1994.  
  In 1994 the EU allocated to Poland altogether 208 million ECU. These funds were allocated to 
support the transformation process in Poland, as well as to the adjustment program concerned with the 
realization of the EA. 
  In the signed document, among others, it is said :   This assistance should be targeted to enhance the preparation of  the integration process of Poland 
to the full membership, which is the common aim of both sides. The PHARE program is a very crucial 
instrument of both: that process, giving financial assistance for implementation of the EA, and sectoral, 
structural and institutional adjustments. These three dimensions of the EU assistance - development, 
transformation and integration - are going to contribute highly in  the reform and modernization 
process in Poland. 
  Programming of the EU assistance, of which main receivers are particular resorts and  departments, 
is connected with realization of tasks defined by the EA. 
  Both sides agreed on financing of nine programmed: 
  The Cross Border Cooperation (58 mln ECU). This program realizes decisions of the EA 
concerned with the development of the infrastructure (Articles 81-86) and investments in the 
borderline regions. In the framework of this program several investment projects are going to be 
financed, especially these on the transport and communication infrastructure on the Polish-German 
border and in the coastal regions. 
  Financial Sector Development (20 mln ECU). The aim of this program, according to the Article 83 
of the European Treaty, is providing technical and educational assistance for the further development 
of the financial sector, especially the development of banking and insurance systems, with the 
particular attention for the banking in the rural areas. 
  Transport infrastructure (35 mln ECU). According to the decisions of the Edinburgh and 
Copenhagen summits of the European Council dealing with financing of the infrastructure 
development, and to the Article 91 of the EA concerned with the cooperation in the field of the 
restructuring and modernization of transport, the aim of this program is targeted at the co-financing of 
investment projects and modernization of the Polish transport infrastructure, particularly the 
motorways network in which the PHARE program is one of sources of funding. As the result of this 
program transit and internal roads connecting Poland with Member States of the EU should be 
modernized. 
  TEMPUS (35 mln ECU). The Article 76 of the EA defines the cooperation of Poland and the EU 
in the field of education which includes the teaching and education reforms, training programmed, 
supporting the European studies. The TEMPUS program contribute to the realization of the declaration 
included in the Article 76 through the interuniversity students teachers exchange. It should allow for 
undertaking common research programmed, further development of educational programmed, 
updating studies programmed and upgrading qualifications of University teachers in the fields which 
are of the special importance to continuation of social and economic reforms, such as: economics, 
management, new technology, ecology, foreign languages, European studies. 
  Development of local democracy and democratic society (10 mln ECU). The general aim of these 
two programmed is the assistance in  development of local societies, help in the regional economic 
development, and institutional strengthening of the local democracy. The assistance will be directed to 
the social and economic development of communes  (including newly created Agencja Rozwoju 
Komunalnego) and building of the democratic society. 
  The work protection (5 mln ECU). The article 87 of the European Treaty regulates cooperation in 
the social sector and give a help in the process  adjustment of the Polish conditions  to the European 
requirements. This program is targeted in acting concerning  with the work environment improvement 
based on experiences of the EU in that field, as well as with supporting processes of adjusting law 
regulations applicable to the protection of employees in their work places. 
  The forestry protection (12 mln ECU). The financial support in the framework of this program 
will be employed on the restoration of damaged forests. These funds will be additional to the loan of 
the World Bank, and expected results should be beneficial not only to the environment but also to the 
agriculture, tourism and quality of life. 
  Restructuring (11 mln ECU). According to the Articles 72 and 78 of the EA, this program should 
give the financial support for medium size enterprises having problems with the short term liquidity, 
but being potentially profitable in long term. Additionally this program is going to finance further 
works concerned with updating energetic sectors and contribute to the program "Stabilization, 
Restructurization, Privatization"  realizing in the cooperation with the EBRD. 
  FIESTA 3 (ECU 22 mln). Fiesta 3 is the continuation of earlier programmed of this type. It 
includes in its scope financing expenses connected with Polish participation in new open EU 
programmed for the CEECs (following decisions taken on the summit of the European Council in Copenhagen), supporting development of the information infrastructure, continuation other PHARE 
programmed launched in earlier years, and also supporting research undertaken for development of the 
Polish economic strategy. 
  It is very likely that the indicative PHARE program is the last annual program. In accordance to 
the strategy preparing the associated countries to the membership, following PHARE programmed will 
be launched for five years. In that way it is expected to bring the element of the stability in the 
financial cooperation between the associated countries and the European Union institutions, as well as 
to let the associated countries for the long-term planning (e.g. assistance to the structural changes). The 
Commission proposed that on the following summit of Twelve in Essen the European Council took a 
decision to cancel 15% limitage of funds assign for the investment purposes, especially infrastructural. 
The above solutions concerning these matters would be adequate to proposals made by the Polish side.  
 
 
Proposals and recommendations 
  
 
  Poland's earlier experiences connected with the non-repayable assistance from the European 
Communities as well as loans granted by the European Investment Bank are not sufficiently substantial 
to be discussed in terms of their results and effectiveness regardless of the fact that majority of the 
realized programs concerning both the non-repayable assistance and projects financed by the EIB are 
still not finished. 
  Unquestionably PHARE program assistance turns out to be the most significant source of the non-
repayable foreign assistance supporting the process of socio-economic transformations. Being not 
included into the budgetary means of the recipient's government the means of assistance in certain 
measure supplement the budget permitting thus to increase the general expenses of the government 
connected with the transformation of economy. Though, it would be inordinately optimistic to expect 
that the assistance coming from the European Communities or even foreign assistance for Poland in 
general will profoundly change its the economic situation either in the short or longer term. The future 
success of economic reforms, economic development as well as the process of Poland's integration 
with the European Union depend mainly on the internal ability to create an efficient managing system 
and mobility of the original capital. Accordingly, the outer assistance may serve - adequately to its 
amount - to accelerate and to make easy the transformation aiming at the increase of these qualities. 
The construction of majority of assistance programs coming from the European Communities reflects 
the "philosophy" above. Yet unsatisfactory tempo of their realization demands to take certain steps 
leading to improvement and acceleration of the process of planning and introducing programs and 
projects which are financed from the foreign assistance. 
  Alan Mayhew, who is in charge of the Phare Program, identified three platforms that EU 
assistance for Poland should be based on: 
—  we are now in the new political framework. EU assistance should first of all finance the 
integration of Poland into the Union, 
—  support for investment is the second platform. EU assistance should be more than know- how, it 
ought to open the possibilities to develop into a more substantial financing instruments, to support 
Poland's structural development efforts, 
—  the third platform is the important role to render assistance more efficient and effective through 
coordination with other donors, particularly with the International Financial Institutions. The 
combination of EU grants with International Financial Institutions' loans can be a very potent mixture, 
enhancing the value of both institutions' financing.  
 
Recommendations concerning particular forms of assistance and their connections: 
-  as far as the non-repayable assistance is concerned instead of providing general technical help it 
should be focused mainly on direct support given to investments. However the reforms are still in a 
need of technical support, being much better specified they require thus less expenditure. 
Facing difficult situation of public finances technical assistance as such should be first and foremost 
concentrated on: 
-  short as well as long-term improvement of effectiveness in managing public companies - through 
their privatization and improvement of managing skills -  short and long-term improvement of functioning of the system of financing investments both in 
private and public sectors - through advisory and training activity for the commercial banks and 
potential investors - credit takers. 
-  short and long-term improvement of management in general as far as public sector (education, 
medical care) is concerned leading thus to substantial betterment in effectiveness of limited public 
expenses 
-  long-term support given in order to achieve these objectives - through educational and training 
activities. 
The support given to investments should be focused on: 
-  continuation of providing support for mechanism stimulating mobility of the domestic private 
capital - for instance mechanisms applied in the STRUDER program 
-  direct co-financing of infrastructure investments with financial input coming from the loans of 
international financial institutions and other budgetary sources 
As far as the loans of EIB are concerned it is indicated that the government should define the general 
strategy of negotiating and operating loans from the international financial institutions. Only then 
financing from EIB loans international enterprises on "European scale" would seem sensible with 
priority given to those concerning telecommunication and transport infrastructures. 
  It could be assumed that co-financing other undertakings practiced previously by EIB - with the 
World Bank as a main lender - results rather from the lack of reasonable projects within the main EIB 
specialties than the want of insurance. Thus it would be suggested that the future loans of the EIB 
would concern already known area in which it could act as a independent lender what would in a 
certain respect shorten the negotiations concerning loans and make their operating easier. 
  On 14 march, the European Commission approved a Communication to the Council on "Industrial 
Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe".The prinicipal idea of this report is that so far the 
industrial base and necessary mofernization is lagging behind. The report says that industries of 
associated countries have very considerable restructuring/modernization needs, which are "unlikely to 
be satisfied without foreign investment, transfer of technology and know-how in cooperation with EU 
industry". It is believed that the cooperation between EU industry and the CEEC would contribute to 
the restructurization and would facilitate the accession. 
 
 
Appendix: 
 
EU - Financial Assistance 
 
  ³Total (bln ECU)  
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Cohesion Fund (1993 - 99)  ³15.1  
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Regional policy:  ³ 
- assistance for regions, whose development is lagging behind (1994 -99)  ³ 
  - declinig industrial areas (1994 - 96)  ³93.8 
- combating long-term unemployment (1994)  ³2.1 
- adjustments of agricaltural structures (1994)   ³13.9 
 ³1.13 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Community initiatives: (1994 - 99)  ³ 
Interreg II  ³2.9 
Leader II  ³1.4 
Regis II  ³0.6 
Adapt ³1.4 
Rechar II  ³0.4 
Resider II  ³0.5 Konver ³0.5 
Retex ³0.5 
SMEs ³1.0 
Urban ³0.6 
Pecsa ³0.25 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Total: ³136.08 
 
Source: based on General report on the activities of the EU, 1994. 
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